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Antitrust Liability in the Context of Medical Peer
Review: The Implications of Patrick v. Burget and
the Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986
On November 4, 1989, the Department of Justice announced in a
New York Times article that government antitrust regulation of
the health care industry is to be escalated. Keeping this in mind,
consider the following scenario: A physician, Dr. Jones, joins the
staff of a hospital in Pennsylvania. Although the Pennsylvania hos-
pital received no recommendations from Dr. Jones' former hospital
in California, regarding the quality of the physician's skills, Dr.
Jones had attended medical school with the chief of staff of the
Pennsylvania hospital. He was hired, and, a couple of years later,
granted staff privileges. Following a series of unfortunate "mis-
haps" and after other staff members reported several confronta-
tional discussions with the doctor, the hospital decided to recon-
sider Dr. Jones' staff privileges. The hospital conducted a three-
day hearing, with thousands of pages of testimony and numerous
exhibits. In the end, the hospital found that the "mishaps" re-
sulted from the improper actions and misguided decisions of Dr.
Jones. Further, it was discovered that Jones had left the California
hospital after it had revoked his staff privileges. Several doctors
also testified that Jones behaved in a disrespectful and abusive
manner toward the staff. Upon the conclusion of the hearing, the
hospital terminated Jones' staff privileges. Now, the hospital is
compelled to expend thousands of dollars for legal fees and spend
weeks in litigation in order to avoid paying thousands of dollars in
treble damages arising from a private action brought by Jones, who
alleges violations of the antitrust laws. All of this stands at risk
because the staff of one Pennsylvania hospital sought to protect
the public from harmful medical treatment.
As unreasonable as this scenario may appear, no single health
care industry practice has been the target of more antitrust law-
suits than hospital denial of medical staff privileges.1 Antitrust
1. Enders, Federal Antitrust Issues Involved in one Denial of Medical Staff Privi-
leges, 17 Loy. U. CHi., L.J. 331, 331 (1986). Grossman Jaffe, The Health Care Quality Im-
provement Act: Antitrust Liability in Peer Review,Vol. xxiv TORT AND INSURANCE L.J. 571,
572 (Spring 1989).
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claims of this nature are brought under Section One of the Sher-
man Act which makes "every contract, combination . .. , or con-
spiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce" illegal.2 Today, in order
for a physician plaintiff to qualify for standing under the Sherman
Act, he must show that the challenged activity either directly in-
volves interstate commerce or that it bears a substantial effect on
interstate commerce.3 Along with the obvious public policies in
favor of the peer review process, and the defenses provided by the
McCarran-Ferguson Act,4 the "learned professions" theory, and
the state action exemption, the prerequisite of establishing inter-
state commerce was considered a substantial shield against anti-
trust litigation in health services until the mid-1970's3 Since then,
courts have worked to tear down some of these obstacles and to
offer more precise guidelines concerning the application of others.'
The Supreme Court first held the interstate commerce element
satisfied where the plaintiff established that a substantial relation-
ship, direct or indirect, existed between the activities of the de-
fendant and interstate commerce.7 Four years later the Supreme
Court modified this standard in deciding McLain v. Real Estate
Board of New Orleans Inc." McLain presented the "effects on
commerce" test. Under this test, which most circuit courts follow,
the plaintiff surpasses the prerequisite of the Sherman Act by
showing that the particular activities of the defendant to which he
objects affect interstate commerce.' At least one circuit, the ninth,
has adopted an even more relaxed standard in inquiring whether
interstate commerce is involved in any of the defendant's business
activities.10 The continuing modifications of the standard contrib-
2. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982). In such a lawsuit, a plaintiff physician will allege that the
physicians on the peer review board have conspired together to remove him from the staff of
the hospital and have therefore agreed illegally to boycott the plaintiff.
3. Enders, supra, note 1, at 332-33. See McLain v. Real Estate Board of New Orle-
ans, Inc., 444 U.S. 232, 242 (1980). 15 U.S.C.A. § 1012(b)(1982).
4. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1012(b)(1982). The McCarran-Ferguson Act provides an express
statutory exemption from antitrust laws for the "business of insurance."
5. See, Grossman Jaffe, supra, note 1 at 573.
6. Hospital Building Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hospital, 425 U.S. 738 (1976).
7. Id. at 739.
8. 444 U.S. 232 (1980).
9. See, Grossman Jaffe, supra, note 1 at 573, citing Cordova & Simonpictori Ins.
Agency v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 649 F.2d 36, 45 (1st Cir. 1981); Furlong v. Long Island
College Hospital, 710 F.2d 922, 926 (2d Cir. 1983); Stone v. William Beaumont Hosp., 782
F.2d 609, 614 (6th Cir. 1986); Seglin v. Esau, 769, F.2d 1274, 1280 (7th Cir. 1985); Hayden v.
Bracy, et. al., 744 F.2d 1338, 1342-43, (8th Cir. 1984); Crane v. Intermountain Health Care,
Inc., 637 F.2d 715, 719-22 (10th Cir. 1981) (en banc.).
10. Western Waste Servs Sys. v. Universal Waste Control, 616 F.2d 1094, 1097 (9th
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uted to the overall diminishing of defenses available in antitrust
suits in the health care industry."
Only recently has the health care industry become subject to liti-
gation founded on antitrust gounds. Before 1975, the "learned pro-
fessions" defense announced in United States v. Oregon State
Medical Society12 served to exempt the medical profession from
such suits by construing the words "trade or commerce" in Section
One of the Sherman Act to exclude areas involving professional
services. 13 In 1975, the defense was brushed away in Goldfarb v.
Virginia State Bar Ass'n,"' allowing antitrust scrutiny of
professionals.15
Citing Goldfarb, the Supreme Court in Arizona v. Maricopa
City Medical Society, 6 firmly closed the door on the "learned pro-
fessions defense" for doctors by holding that the parties to a price
fixing agreement are liable under the first section of the Sherman
Act, whether the parties are nonprofessionals or doctors.17 Interest-
ingly, the Maricopa Court also rejected the argument that the per
se rule in regard to price fixing should not apply to the case in view
of the judiciary's lack of experience in the health care industry. 8
With no professional exemption available, health care institu-
tions began to lean on the McCarran-Ferguson Act's exemption for
the "business of insurance" as protection from antitrust lawsuits.19
The Supreme Court, however, has acted to limit this defense as
well. In Union Labor Life Ins. Co. v. Pireno,20 advisements of a
peer review committee to a health insurer concerning doctors'
treatments and charges failed to constitute part of the "business of
insurance" exempted from antitrust laws by the Act.2' Moreover,
the "business of insurance" was distinguished from "business of
Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 869 (1980).
11. See, Grossman Jaffe, supra, note 1 at 573.
12. 343 U.S. 326 (1952).
13. Id. at 331.
14. 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
15. Id. at 787.
16. 457 U.S. 332 (1982).
17. Id. at 348-49.
18. Id. at 349-50. In United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940), the
Supreme Court established a per se rule to apply to all cases of price fixing: "Under the
Sherman Act, a combination formed for the purpose of and with the effect of raising, de-
pressing, fixing, pegging, or stabilizing the price of a commodity in interstate or foreign
commerce is illegal per se." Id. at 223.
19. See supra note 4.
20. 458 U.S. 119 (1982).
21. Id.
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insurers" in Group Life and Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 22 in
which the Supreme Court held the exemption applicable only to
the latter. 23 By diminishing the defenses of hospitals, these deci-
sions serve only to encourage antitrust litigation in the health care
industry.2
The defense which has received the most recent Supreme Court
review-the "state action" antitrust exemption-originated in
Parker v. Brown.2 5 Parker v. Brown involved a challenge to a Cali-
fornia statute by a raisin producer who alleged the statute "tended
to restrict competition among the growers and maintain prices in
the distribution of their commodities to packers." 26 The Supreme
Court held that the state was exempt from antitrust attack, as
"nothing in the language of the Sherman Act or in its history...
suggests that its purpose was to restrain a state or its officers or
agents from activities directed by its legislature. '27 In California
Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, 28 the Supreme
Court applied the state action doctrine and announced the current
standard for antitrust immunity: the challenged activity must be
clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed as state policy and
the activity must be actively supervised by the state itself.29 The
state action exemption, therefore, cannot apply to a grant of gen-
eral authority that fails to give adequate direction or guidance to
the enforcing agencies. °
The Supreme Court reinforced support of this standard in Pat-
rick v. Burget.31 In this case, the plaintiff physician accused the
peer review committee of bad faith conduct in making their deci-
sion to deny him staff privileges. While the jury awarded the plain-
tiff damages, the ninth circuit reversed the trial court, reasoning
that state-authorized medical peer review decisions are actions of
one state and immune from public and private antitrust attacks.2
The Supreme Court then reversed the Ninth Circuit, although
22. 440 U.S. 205 (1979).
23. Id. at 211.
24. See, Grossman Jaffe, supra, note 1 at 573.
25. 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
26. Id. at 346.
27. Id. at 350-51.
28. 445 U.S. 97 (1980).
29. Id. at 105.
30. See, Grossman Jaffe, supra, note 1 at 574, citing Community Communications Co.
v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40, 54-56 (1982).
31. 108 S. Ct. 1658 (1988).
32. Patrick v. Burget, 800 F.2d 1498, 1506-07, (9th Cir. 1986).
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without affirmance of the trial court's reasoning or award of dam-
ages. Instead, the Court held that the state action doctrine did not
protect Oregon physicians from federal antitrust liability for their
participation in peer review committees where no showing was
made that state officials had exercised their authority to review
anti-competitive acts, such as the denial of staff privileges, and to
disapprove of those acts which were inconsistent with state regula-
tory policy.3 In Oregon, the Supreme Court found no active super-
vision of peer-review decisions and no clearly articulated state pol-
icy on the matter. Therefore, the Court remanded the case for
further proceedings."
With their decision in Patrick, the Supreme Court sustained the
state action doctrine and its applicability as a defense for hospitals
in fighting antitrust suits. Particularly, Patrick strengthened the
precedential value of the Seventh Circuit's decision in Marrese v.
Intergual, Inc.35 In Marrese, the circuit court held that where a
state designs a clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed stat-
utory scheme requiring a hospital's review of a physician's privi-
leges and where the state actively regulates the hospital's peer re-
view procedures, a physician is precluded from attacking any
decision of the peer review committee on federal antitrust
grounds.3 6
The plaintiff in Marrese was an orthopedic surgeon whose
clinical privileges at the defendant hospital were revoked in accor-
dance with the detailed procedures followed by the hospital. 37 Dr.
Marrese opted to allege violations of sections 1 and 2 of the Sher-
man Act,38 which offered a treble damage award, rather than pur-
sue the matter through the Indiana state court system.39 The trial
court dismissed the plaintiff's complaint, stating that defendants'
alleged unlawful actions did not have a substantial effect on inter-
state commerce.40 On appeal, despite finding an impact on inter-
state commerce, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the result of the
lower court by holding that the hospital and its staff members were
33. 108 S. Ct. at 1664.
34. Id. at 1664-65.
35. 748, F.2d 373 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied (1985). See Otto, Flam, and Silverman,
An Approach to Limiting Antitrust Review of Hospital Peer Review Decisions, INS. COUNS.
J., 457, 460 (July, 1986).
36. 748 F.2d at 374.
37. Id. at 374-75.
38. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1 and 2 (1983).
39. Id.
40. 748 F.2d at 373.
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protected from antitrust liability under the state action doctrine."'
Applying the test articulated by the Supreme Court in Califor-
nia Retail Liquor Dealers' Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum,42 the Mar-
rese court studied Indiana's comprehensive statutory scheme
which mandated that hospitals review the professional practices
and procedures of their medical staffs through peer-review com-
mittees. 3 Indiana also actively participated in the peer review pro-
cedures through its licensing requirements of hospitals and physi-
cians." These two facts provided the court with the confidence
that Dr. Marrese's clinical privileges had been revoked in accor-
dance with "clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed "state
policies of peer review which were "actively supervised" by the
state. Thus, the hospital's staff privilege decision was immune from
antitrust attack because of state subsidized protection.' 5
The Marrese court used the opportunity of the case to offer pol-
icy reasons supporting refusal by federal courts to review hospital
staff privilege decisions under the antitrust laws. Application of
the antitrust law "chill[s] the rights and obligations of the physi-
cians to participate in peer review" and hinders the "discovery of
incompetent physicians. . . ."" The court resolved:
It is only logical that physicians within the State of Indiana, when
presented with allegations of federal antitrust violations and the threat of
treble damages, will either dilute their peer review reports and cease recom-
mending the revocation of a hospital staff member's privileges or will dis-
continue their participation in the state mandated and supervised peer re-
view process. As a result, the very lifeline of the medical peer review process
will be severed.' 7
It appears to be the position of the Seventh Circuit that one who
suffers alleged injuries due to a peer review decision should seek
remedy in the state court system. The Marrese Court also pointed
to the extensive in-house review of the peer review findings pro-
vided by the hospital itself.'8 Finding the doctor's action precipi-
tated by a motive to "circumvent[] the hospital's hearings and the
41. Id.
42. 445 U.S. 97 (1980), see supra note 23 and accompanying text.
43. 748 F.2d at 386-87.
44. Id. at 387-89.
45. Id. at 395.
46. Id. at 391, citing Pontius v. Children's Hospital, 552 F. Supp. 1352 (N.D.Pa. 1982).
47. Id.
48. Id. at 393.
49. Id.
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state court review process in favor of a Federal forum,""9 the court
concluded:
Dr. Marrese has no cause of action under the Sherman Act against the de-
fendants as participants in the state mandated and supervised medical peer
review process. Instead, Dr. Marrese must challenge the defendant's con-
duct and motives through the proper forums; the hospital hearing commit-
tees and the Indiana state court systems.6 0
To support its holding, the Marrese Court relied on a decision
from the United States District Court for the Western District of
Pennsylvania." In Pontius v. Children's Hospital,"2 the Pennsyl-
vania District Court reviewed the applicability of traditional anti-
trust principles in the staff privilege context and severly limited
the review which courts should undertake in such cases." The
court held that judicial review of a peer review decision should not
differ whether a suit is initiated in state or federal court." The
threshold inquiries for any court in a staff privilege case are
whether the plaintiff was afforded due process and whether there
was substantial evidence to support the decision. 5 If so, the Sher-
man Act is not invoked and no review of the peer review decision is
necessary.56 Possible anti-competitive implications arise only where
due process or substantial evidence or both are absent."7
In accord with the Seventh Circuit, Pontius communicated that
satisfactory review and remedy for staff privilege decisions are pro-
vided by state courts: "While we recognize that there is some risk
that a physician might impugn the qualifications of a competitor
before a credential committee or a peer review board, we have no
reason to believe that the profession itself or state laws pertaining
to defamation cannot adequately address this problem. ' 58 The
court stated further: "We do not believe that the antitrust laws
were intended to require a judicial redetermination of such
decisions." 59
The opinions in Patrick, Maresse and Pontius represent the ma-
jority view of courts that decisions concerning a physician's privi-
50. Id.
51. See Otto, Flam, and Silverman, An Approach to Limiting Antitrust Review of
Hospital Peer Review Decisions, INS. CouNs. J., at 461.
52. 552 F. Supp. 1352 (W.D. Pa. 1982).
53. Id. at 1353.
54. Id. at 1371.
55. Id. at 1372.
56. Id. at 1372.
57. Id. at 1372.
58. Id. at 1376.
59. Id. at 1378.
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leges should remain with the hospital's staff. If judicial review is at
all necessary, courts should not review the merits of a decision but
only determine whether substantial evidence existed and due pro-
cess was followed.60 In support of this view, Congress has recently
codified public policy in favor of peer review. The Health Care
Quality Improvement Act,"1 effective since November 14, 1986,
shields hospitals and physicians engaged in peer review decisions
from private suits under the federal antitrust laws.2
Through establishment of the Health Care Quality Improvement
Act ("the Act"), Congress' first priority focused on the prevention
of further harm resulting from actions of incompetent and unpro-
fessional physicians.6 " Congress intended the Act's provisions to
assist organizations such as state licensing boards, hospitals, and
medical staffs in promptly discovering and expelling such doctors
from their communities. Because of inadequate peer review proce-
dures and a lack of communication among hospitals in various re-
gions of the country, increasingly more physicians who have in-
jured numerous patients were continuing their practices
undetected or, once detected, transferred to distant, unsuspecting
hospitals. 4 The Act, therefore, concentrates on two principal
objectives. Directed to physicians and health organizations, the Act
firsf provides methods of encouraging and participating in exten-
sive peer review and second, creates a system of dissemination of
information through which hospitals may communicate regarding a
physician's conduct. 5 The legislation provides a grant of immunity
for peer review committees and limits their damages in any litiga-
tion initiated by a physician affected by their decisions.6 With this
immunity and limitation of damages, Congress intended to reduce
the chilling effect that antitrust suits have on peer review
procedures. 7
As a hastily passed response to the ninth circuit's decision in
Patrick v. Burget, the Act is criticized as establishing an immunity
60. See Otto, supra note 51, at 462.
61. Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986, 42 U.S.C. §§ 11101 et seq (1986).
62. Id. at 11101.
63. H.R. Rep. No. 99-903, 99th Cong. 2d Sess. 2 (1986) to accompany H.R. 5540, the
predecessor of the Act, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 6384, 6384. [here-
inafter H.R. Rep.].
64. Id.
65. 42 U.S.C. §§ 11111-15 (1982). See also, Grossman Jaffe, supra., note 1 at 577.
66. 42 U.S.C. §§ 11131-37 (1982).
67. Id. at 11101(4) and (5). See Inglehardt, Congress Moves to Bolster Peer Review:
The Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986, 316 NEW ENG. J. MED. 960 (1987).
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too expansive for its purpose:
Measures already exist to discourage physicians from filing unfounded
claims or claims in bad faith. One section of the Act reinforces and expands
the general provision awarding attorneys' fees to defendants where the suits
brought against them were frivolous or unfounded. Even without the Act's
wide scope of immunity, the attorneys' fees provision will protect peer re-
view committees more than adequately. The belief that the evaluation pro-
cess may at least improve the quality of health care gives credence to the
argument that reviewers need antitrust damage immunity. However, no
such logic flows from giving committee members unbounded protection
from damage liability. Furthermore, the Act does not condition review com-
mittees' immunity on efforts to confirm the accuracy of information they
receive. Thus, by protecting reviewers from the possibility of being sued
outside the antitrust context, the Act will preclude deserving plaintiffs from
securing important rights and remedies without necessarily improving peer
review. 8
While the Act eliminates the threat of private treble damage lia-
bility, it provides less protection than the state action exemption
supported by the Supreme Court in Patrick v. Burget.6 9 The Act is
also in discord with the recently announced objectives of the De-
partment of Justice's Antitrust Division, as it fails to encourage
governmental agencies to pursue alleged antitrust violations in the
health care arena.7 ° Instead, the Act allows physicians themselves
to supervise the peer review procedures from initiation to conclu-
sion rather than arbitrarily shifting the police power to the govern-
ment on those occasions where an antitrust violation may have oc-
curred.71 In as far as this attitude comports with Patrick, the view
of the Act favors decisions by peer review committees who logically
appear in the best position to make such decisions, free from
threats of treble damages and the hours and costs involved in liti-
gating an antitrust suit.
72
In several cases, courts have acknowledged and respected the
principle that hospitals only possess the necessary expertise to
guarantee the right end in a peer review situation.73 While courts
68. See, Grossman Jaffe, surpa, note 1 at 589-90.
69. Id. at 590.
70. Id. at 592.
71. Id.
72. While the Supreme Court has recognized this policy, it reserved all comment on its
viability, referring the matter to Congress. "Th[e] argument [that the threat of antitrust
liability chills peer review and impairs its effectiveness] essentially challenges the wisdom of
applying the antitrust laws to the sphere of medical care and as such is properly directed to
the legislative branch." Patrick, 108 S. Ct. at 1665.
73. See, Otto, supra, note 51 at 457, citing Schulman v. Washington Hosp. Center, 222
F. Supp. 59 (D.C. Cir. 1963); Moore v. Andaluna Hosp., Inc., 284 Ala. 259, 244 So. 2d 617
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admittedly hold the expertise to judge competence in attorneys,
for courts to profess the ability to do the same with regard to phy-
sicians raises some concern. In.Sosa v. Board of Managers of Val
Verde Memorial Hospital,"' the Fifth Circuit Court explains the
court's deference to review a decision of a peer review committee.
No court should substitute its evaluation of such matters for that of the
Hospital Board. It is the board, not the court, which is charged with the
responsibility of providing a competent staff of doctors. The Board has cho-
sen to rely on the advice of its Medical Staff, and the court cannot surrogate
for the Staff in executing this responsibility. Human lives are at stake, and
the governing board must be given discretion in its selection so that it can
have confidence in the competence and moral commitment of its staff. The
evaluation of professional proficiency of doctors is best left to the special-
ized expertise of their piers, subject only to limited judicial surveillance.
The court is charged with the narrow responsibility of assuring that the
qualifications imposed by the Board are reasonably related to the operation
of the hospital and fairly administered."
The fact that hospital liability arising from a physician's conduct
is a theory of judicial creation also persuades courts to exercise
considerable restraint in this area.76 If the hospitals themselves
must bear the risk of their doctors' malpractice, it is only just that
the hospitals be the judge with regard to the standard of compe-
tence for their doctors.
The hesitation of courts to review cases involving peer review
decisions only contributes to the increasing number of such cases
brought under federal antitrust laws. 7" Despite the courts' aversion
(1969).
The Supreme Court recognized Congress' action by including the following footnote in
their decision of Patrick:
Congress in fact insulated certain medical peer review activities from antitrust liabil-
ity in the Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986. (citation omitted). The Act,
which was enacted well after the events at issue in this case and is not retroactive,
essentially immunizes peer review action from liability if the action was taken in the
reasonable belief that [it] was in the furtherance of quality health care." The Act
expressly provides that it does not change other 'immunities under the law', including
the state action immunity, thus allowing states to immunize peer-review action that
does not meet the federal standard.
108 S. Ct. at 1665, n.8.
74. 437 F.2d 173 (5th Cir. 1971). See Leach v. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2, 870
F.2d 300, 302 (5th Cir. 1989); Silverstein v. Gwinnett Hosp. Authority, 861 F.2d 1560, 1567
(11th Cir. 1988).
75. 437 F.2d at 177.
76. See, Otto, supra, note 51 at 458, citing Darling v. Charleston Comm. Hosp., 211
N.E.2d 253 (Ill. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 946 (1966); Johnson v. Misericordia Comm.
Hosp., 294 N.W.2d 501 (Wis.Ct.App. 1980), affd, 301 N.W.2d 156 (Wis. 1981).
77. Kissam, Webber, Bigus & Holzgraefe, Antitrust and Hospital Privileges: Testing
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to awarding treble damages to the plaintiff physician, lawsuits
founded on antitrust allegations thrust tremendous financial, tem-
poral and emotional burdens on all parties involved." Neverthe-
less, in view of Patrick v. Burget and the establishment of the
Health Care Quality Improvement Act, it is apparent that neither
the Supreme Court nor Congress deem the need to fully insulate
medical peer review from the antitrust laws imperative at this
time. Indeed, the Supreme Court in Patrick handed all responsibil-
ity for this task to Congress and physicians.79 As for now, hospitals
and peer review committees remain vulnerable targets of vengeful
physicians, and, assumedly, the Department of Justice. Therefore,
it must be the hope of the hospitals that the courts accept defenses
such as the state action exemption and apply the immunity pro-
vided by Congress in analyzing allegations of antitrust violations in
peer review cases. As precedents, the lower courts have fortunately
fashioned major policy arguments favoring the hospitals as the ex-
perts in reviewing medical staff privilege decisions. Once the Su-
preme Court and Congress acknowledge the wisdom of such poli-
cies, medical peer review committees may resume concentration on
their major objectives to provide quality medical care and to pro-
tect the public from incompetent and unprofessional. medical
treatment.
Jennifer L. Otto
the Conventional Wisdom, 70 CALIF. L. REV. 595, 596, n.2 (1982).
78. See Marrese v. Interqual, 748 F.2d at 391, which quotes Pontius v. Children's Hos-
pital, 552 F. Supp. at 1362 concerning an antitrust lawsuit's consequence of "incurring legal
fees running into six figures and a trial of a duration measured in months, on the mere
allegation that they have conspired to restrain trade..." Marrese, 748 F.2d at 391. Marrese
continued, stating that the threat of treble damages "will compel able and qualified physi-
cians, with particular expertise in complex areas of medicine, to abdicate their participation
in the medical peer review process." Id. at 391-92.
79. In a footnote regarding the Health Care Quality Improvement Act, the Patrick
Court advised: "If physicians believe that the Act provides insufficient immunity to protect
the peer review process fully, they must take that matter up with Congress." 108 S. Ct. at
1665-1667, n.8.
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